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Abstract
In models of non-deterministic contest, players exert irreversible eﬀort in order to
increase their probability of winning a prize. The most prominent functional form of
the win probability in the literature is the so-called “logit” contest success function.
We provide a simple micro-foundation of this function for the two contestant case. In
this setting the contest administrator is a rational decision maker whose optimal choice
is deterministic. However, from the point of view of the contestants the outcome of
the contest is probabilistic because of an underlying uncertainty about the type of the
administrator.
Keywords: Contests, Contest Success Function, Eﬀort levels, Endogenous Contest.
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“...Just as there is a technology of production, there is a technology of conﬂict and
struggle. The key to the latter is the Conﬂict Success Function (CSF). ...”
Hirshleifer (1989), p. 101
“...the analysis of equilibrium or endogenous contests has reached only a very pre-
liminary and inadequate stage of development. Future progress in this direction will
constitute a signiﬁcant contribution to the theory of rent seeking, public choice and,
more generally, to political economy. ...”
Nitzan (1994), p. 56
1. Introduction
The Nash demand game is a non-cooperative game that supports the Nash solution of
two-person bargaining games (see Nash (1953), Trockel (2000)). In doing so it answers
the basic question, how the implicit model of rational individual behavior supporting
the Nash solution may look like.
The aim of this work is to carry out a similar exercise concerning the most prominent
model of non-deterministic contests. More speciﬁcally we ask: Can we think about the
underlying model of individual behavior in a way that is analogous to the way we think
about the auction of an object? In the standard (incomplete information) model of
an auction bidders face uncertainty about the competing bidders’ type. Given thisA Micro-Foundation for Logit Form Contests 4
uncertainty they behave rationally and choose deterministically an optimal bid. The
success of this bid is non-deterministic. For some types of competitors the bidder obtains
the object while for others not.
In a contest game agents exert irreversible eﬀort to increase their probability of
winning a prize. Contests have been used to analyze a variety of situations including
rent-seeking and rent-defending contests, lobbying, litigation, political campaigns, con-
ﬂict, patent races, arms races, sports events, R&D competition or coalition formation.
Contests in which the player exerting the highest eﬀort wins the prize with probabil-
ity one, like in an all-pay auction, are called deterministic (or perfectly discriminating).
In non-deterministic contests the probability of winning is given by a contest success
function (henceforth CSF) which depends on the eﬀorts of the players. In deciding on
the mathematical formulation of the CSF the literature has largely used a CSF in logit




, i ∈ {1,2}, j  = i. (1.1)
In this formulation πi is the probability that contestant Ci wins the contest given the
vector of eﬀorts e = (e1,e2) of the two contestants and the eﬀectivity functions gi( ).
The eﬀectivity functions specify how eﬀort enters the logit CSF and are assumed to be
increasing. They are often the same for all players (symmetry or anonymity assump-
1 Baik (1998) lists 23 papers that use a logit form CSF. We are aware of at least 7 other (recent)
works.A Micro-Foundation for Logit Form Contests 5
tion). Concerning the speciﬁcation of eﬀectivity functions a large part of the literature
has build on Tullock’s (1980) suggestion of an exponential form.2
A better understanding of CSFs has been gained by the axiomatic characterizations
of Skaderpas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998). However, contests are intended to be
a positive model. Therefore, its properties are necessarily part of the phenomena to be
explained and not something to be assumed.3
The only attempt we are aware of to provide a micro-foundation for this model in
which a CSF arises as the optimal choice of rational decision makers is our companion-
paper Dahm and Porteiro (2004). There we oﬀer a very similar approach that rests on
an uncertainty about the state of the world.4 However, there are recent attempts to
endogenize various components of a contest game (for a brief survey see e. g. Nitzan
(1994)).
We deﬁne a two-stage game played by a contest administrator and two contestants.
In the ﬁrst stage contestants exert irreversible eﬀort which aﬀects the payoﬀ function
2 Tullock has later admitted that “I used the exponential form when I wrote “Eﬃcient Rent-Seeking”,
because I wanted a form which showed economics of scale, and that was the standard elementary
textbook method of doing it.” Tullock (1995), p. 190. We found this citation in Clark and Riis (1996).
Amegashie (2003) proposes a variation of Tullocks CSF on tractability grounds. Hirshleifer (1989)
proposes a function of the diﬀerences in eﬀort because equilibrium behavior may capture better certain
situations. Che and Gale (2000) motivate their diﬀerence form CSF by the fact that they are able –
contrary to the literature using Tullocks formulation – to characterize the equilibrium for all levels of
sensitivity of the outcome to contestants’ eﬀorts.
3 This is diﬀerent if we are concerned with the design of a contest. For example, it may be in the
interest of a contest administrator to commit credibly to a CSF that is normatively appealing in order
to induce participation in the contest.
4 Clark and Riis (1996) adopt a random utility formulation in which it is assumed that the contestants
view the contest administrator as maximizing a random utility function.A Micro-Foundation for Logit Form Contests 6
of the administrator. Given this eﬀort the administrator chooses in the second stage to
which contestant to give the prize. From the point of view of the lobbies, success in the
contest is non-deterministic because of an underlying uncertainty about the type of the
administrator. For some types of administrators the contestant obtains the prize while
for others not. However, the administrator’s choice is deterministic.
2. A Micro-Foundation for the Case of Two Contestants
Consider a contest administrator A who is pivotal in the decision to give a political prize,
e.g. a procurement contract, to either of two contestants C1 and C2. The decision taken
is denoted by D and we will write D = Ci if contestant Ci is given the prize. Contestants’
valuations for the prize are given by Vi ≥ 0.5
In order to advance their aims contestants can exert eﬀort ei ∈ R+ at a cost ci(ei).
This eﬀort is irreversible and aﬀects the politician in form of an eﬀectivity function gi(ei).
Suppose there is a parameter t which characterizes the type of the politician from the
point of view of contestants. The parameter t is distributed on the line segment [0,1]
according to some cumulative distribution function F. Deﬁne t1 = t and t2 = 1−t. We
postulate the following functional form for the payoﬀ of the contest administrator from
5 In the two-contestants case it is unambiguous to interpret the political prize as a decision over
a policy – in which case it is natural to assume contestants may obtain a non-zero utility from not





i ≥ 0, (i = 1,2 and j  = i) where V
j
i denotes the utility achieved by contestant i when the
policy chosen is j. With more than two contestants a non-zero utility from not getting the prize may
diﬀer depending on the policy choice. This adds additional considerations to the optimization problem
of contestants.A Micro-Foundation for Logit Form Contests 7
giving the prize to contestant Ci
UA(D = Ci) = tigi(ei). (2.1)
To provide an interpretation for this formulation consider the following example.
Example 2.1. Contests are frequently used in the literature to model lobbying of leg-
islators. Consider a political decision-maker who must decide among two policy alter-
natives with diﬀerent consequences for the environment. There are two interest groups,
one representing the industry and one environmental group. Both groups can dedicate
eﬀort, political pressure or propaganda campaigns, in order to lobby the electorate. An
environmentally friendly voting record may prove important if the legislator decides
later in his career to run for president. On the other hand, the politician may decide
to become a lobbyist for the industry in the future. Both lobbies face uncertainty con-
cerning the future plans of the politician.
One way to capture such a situation may use the following eﬀectivity function
gi(ei) = f(ei) + Γi. (2.2)
These functions diﬀer only by an additive component Γi. The administrator’s choice
depends on three determinants:
1. His type t representing the future plans of the legislator which are a randomA Micro-Foundation for Logit Form Contests 8
variable from the point of view of the lobbies.
2. The eﬀective eﬀorts of the lobbies f(ei) reﬂecting the result of e. g. the propaganda
campaigns.
3. The additive components Γi. One may think of Γ1 as the relative advantage policy
L1 has over L2 in terms of damage to the environment. Similarly, Γ2 may capture
beneﬁts of a future employment as a lobbyist for industry L2.6
Coming back to the administrator’s payoﬀs described in (2.1), note that although
the lobbies know the eﬀectivity functions gi( ), they do not know whether t T 1
2. This
implies that even if eﬀort was known, lobbies would not know which policy the politician
considers optimal. Moreover, they would not know how much better one policy is from
the point of view of the politician.
The timing of the game is sequential. In the ﬁrst stage lobbies exert eﬀort simul-
taneously. Given this eﬀort, the politician awards in the second stage the prize. The
alternative chosen is the one that gives the highest payoﬀs to the politician.7 We have
the following result.
6 An important determinant of the success of lobbying activities is access to politicians. Diﬀerent
access might be reﬂected in diﬀerent Γs and in diﬀerent functions f( ). For simplicity we abstract of
the latter.
7 This model has a structure similar to an all-pay auction as e. g. in Baye et al (1993 and 1996).
The only diﬀerence is informational. Lobbies do not know the politicians type. Thus, the award of the
prize is non-deterministic and the contest is governed by a CSF.A Micro-Foundation for Logit Form Contests 9
Theorem 2.2. Assume t is distributed according to a symmetric density function and
the politician’s payoﬀs are given by (2.1). Then the problem of lobby Li is
max
ei
πi(e)Vi − ci(ei), (2.3)
where πi(e) is a monotonically increasing transformation of the logit form speciﬁed in
equation (1.1).
Proof: We have that
UDM(D = L1) ≥ UDM(D = L2)





An eﬀort vector e leads to a winning probability for lobby L1 of
π1(e) = 1 − F(¯ t). (2.4)









This is a monotonically increasing transformation of the expression in equation (1.1).¥A Micro-Foundation for Logit Form Contests 10
One interesting implication of this micro-foundation concerns symmetric contest. In
the literature a contest is called symmetric if players are identical. The most common
asymmetries considered refer to eﬀectivity functions or valuations of the prize. Consider
the case of symmetric eﬀectivity functions, that is, gi( ) = g( ) for all i. In this case
it is most visible that the decision-maker’s type can be interpreted as being related to
the relative ability of the lobbies to convert eﬀort into utility for the politician. Their
eﬀectivity functions multiplied by ti are the multiples of each other and this multiple
is uncertain. The symmetric contest is non-deterministic because it is an asymmetric
contest with probability one and the degree of this asymmetry is uncertain.
Not surprisingly, the logit form hinges on the diﬀerent assumptions made. With
a non-symmetric distribution of types or diﬀerent support, probability mass would be
shifted from one side of the threshold ¯ t to the other. In fact, one could interpret
such an asymmetry as an ideological bias of the decision-maker. Consider, for instance
that policy C2 is the enviromentally friendly choice. Then, facing a politician of an
uncertain type but characterized by a probability distribution that concentrates the
probability mass on the left tail could be seen as a setting in which it is common knowl-
edge for the contestants that the decision-maker sympathizes with pro-environmental
positions (though his precise decision in a particular choice is uncertain). Even if in
such a scenario still it would be true that eﬀorts aﬀect a threshold value for the ran-
dom variable that determines the choice of the politician, this would give rise to anA Micro-Foundation for Logit Form Contests 11
asymmetric contest which is qualitatively diﬀerent from asymmetric contests in the
literature. Similarly, it is important how eﬀort enters equation (2.1). If eﬀort dif-
ferences are considered important, as e. g. in Baik (1998), then a formulation like
UDM(D = Li) = ti (f(ei) − f(ej) + Γi), i = 1,2, with i  = j may be natural but leads
to a diﬀerent CSF.8
3. Concluding Remarks
In this work we have shown that the two-contestant contest success function of the logit
form can be derived from a rational choice environment. The merit of this approach
is to visualize the implicit micro-level assumptions underlying this non-deterministic
contest.9
There are at least two mayor shortcomings to our approach. Firstly, we do not oﬀer
any explication of what an eﬀectivity function is. Rather we “shift the blackbox” from
the CSF to the payoﬀs of the contest administrator.
Secondly, our model refers to the two contestant case. Mathematically, an extension
of our approach to n-contestants is possible. Given that the logit CSF is characterized
mainly by Luce’s Choice Axiom we can deﬁne a sequential decision process of the contest
administrator that works as follows.10 At stage one the politician partitions the set of
8 However, the family of logit form CSFs contains exponential eﬀectivity functions in which case it
depends on the eﬀort diﬀerence.
9 It is apparent that if we ﬁnd the assumptions in our model questionable, then we cast doubt on
the literature that uses logit form CSFs.
10 For axiomatic characterizations see Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998).A Micro-Foundation for Logit Form Contests 12
lobbies into two coalitions. Each of these coalitions is treated as a single player whose
eﬀort is the sum of the eﬀorts of its members and obtains an overall probability using
the CSF described in (1.1). At the following stages we repeat this proceeding until
all coalitions are singletons. The probability of contestant Ci is the product of all the
probabilities associated to coalitions in which Ci was a member. This process leads to the
desired probabilities and is independent of the particular partitioning process employed.
However, pursuing this line of reasoning provides some problems, in particular: what is
the economic interpretation of the parameter t at each stage?
Rather than a dead end we believe this to open avenues for future research. For
example, if the contest administrator is characterized by a vector of priors t = (t1,...,tn)
with
Pn
i=1 ti = 1, one associated to each contestant, drawn from some distribution, a
contest success function can in principle be deﬁned. We conjecture that it is diﬀerent
from a contest success function of the logit form but we are conﬁdent that such an
approach can lead to economically meaningful models of non-deterministic contests.
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